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COMMENTS
THE NEW MORTGAGES: A FUNCTIONAL LEGAL
ANALYSIS
CHRISTOPHER CASWELL
I. INTRODUCTION
The residential mortgage market in the early 1980's is in the
midst of a dramatic change in lending philosophies, regulations,
and methods. This change is the result of inflation and the high
interest rates of the late 1970's and early 1980's. To accommodate
this new financial scenario, lenders are attempting to create new
mortgage agreements that are more responsive to the changing eco-
nomic environment. As lenders begin to use these new instru-
ments, a new borrowing philosophy must emerge. In many in-
stances the borrower will have to assume the risk of inflation and
changing interest rates. To properly evaluate these new mortgages,
the borrower will have to become more educated about the mort-
gage market, financial planning, and future economic activity.
The mortgage area will also require the increasing attention of
attorneys during the next decade. The traditional mortgage was a
standardized document for which neither borrowers nor lenders
needed much legal advice; legislation protected consumers from
"fine print" and excessive interest charges. Now that borrowers
may have to deal with non-standard lenders and documents, attor-
neys inevitably will be called upon more frequently to analyze the
implications of mortgage agreements.
This comment evaluates the new mortgage instruments that
have evolved from the mortgage crisis of recent years.1 These in-
struments are generally referred to as "alternative mortgage in-
struments" (AMI's) and encompass variations on the elements
comprising the traditional mortgage instruments. After a brief his-
tory of the problems leading to the development of the new mort-
1. Since federal savings and loans (S&L's) provide almost 50% of all one-to-four family
mortgages, the primary focus will be on those thrift institutions. See Federal Role in Con-
ventional Home Financing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs
of the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1981)
(statement of John H. Dalton, Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Dalton]. Federally chartered banks will also be discussed. Each state has its own
specific regulations controlling state-chartered institutions and private lenders; reference to
these will be in footnotes only.
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gage instruments, several of the more common AMI's will be de-
scribed and evaluated. The legal issues pertaining to the whole
array of mortgage instruments will then be analyzed. Finally, some
suggestions will be made about the future of the mortgage lending
market.
II. HISTORY
The "traditional" residential mortgage instrument originated
during the Depression of the 1930's.2 Before then, a substantial
number of household mortgages were short-term, balloon payment
mortgages. s During the Depression many households found them-
selves unable to refinance their balloon payments and thus were
forced into default on their mortgages.4 To remedy this potential
for default, the standard mortgage, known as the Fixed Rate Mort-
gage (FRM), was adopted to provide for a longer term, fully amor-
tized mortgage instrument. Two acts by Congress in 1932 and
1933' created the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Board) and
gave the Board the authority to operate and regulate federal sav-
ings and loan associations (S&L's). By offering these FRM's, fed-
eral S&L's have become the major supplier of residential mort-
gages over the past fifty years.1 As a result, the mortgage portfolios
2. See Comment, The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 1980 and its Effect on the Mortgage Market, 1981 Aaiz. ST. L.J. 211, 211-15 (1981).
3. Balloon payments arise when a mortgage principal is amortized over a longer period
than the term of the mortgage agreement. Thus, the borrower will repay at the longer amor-
tization rate until the last payment of the term when the entire remaining balance of the
mortgage must be repaid in one "balloon" payment. See infra notes 89-91 and accompany-
ing text.
4. Hyer & Kearl, Legal Impediments to Mortgage Innovation, 6 REAL EST. L.J. 211
(1978); Sweat, Mortgages and Alternate Mortgage Instruments, in MORTGAGES AND ALTER-
NATE MORTGAGE INSTRUMENTS 17 (R. Sweat ed. 1981).
5. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Board) was created by the Federal Home Loan
Bank Act of 1932, ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-49
(1976)). The following year, as an emergency measure, Congress passed the Home Owners'
Loan Act of 1933, ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-68 (1976)),
with the following purpose:
To provide emergency relief with respect to home mortgage indebtedness, to refi-
nance home mortgages, to extend relief to the owners of homes occupied by them
and who are unable to amortize their debt elsewhere, to amend the Federal Home
Loan Bank Act, to increase the market for obligations of the United States and
for other purposes.
48 Stat. 128 (1933).
6. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-49 (1976).
7. Other mortgage sources also exist. In addition to federal S&L's, federal banks, insur-
ance companies, pension plans, and state-authorized organizations also provide a share of
the mortgage money in the United States. See Strum, The Roles of Life Insurance Compa-
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of federal S&L's currently consist almost entirely of these long-
term, fixed rate mortgages.8
The first significant rise in the level of inflation in the 1950's and
early 1960's caused lenders to increase their fixed interest rates to
reflect anticipated inflationary pressures. In the 1970's azd 1980's,
with inflation reaching double-digit levels, lenders (and specifically
S&L's) have found themselves with a "portfolio lag"10 of long-term
commitment to mortgage loans at low fixed rates without the abil-
ity to reinvest that capital in the current high-interest market. To
compensate for this lag, lenders must thus charge higher-than-
market interest rates on new FRM's: 11 "In effect, the new home
buyer who borrows under a FRM is subsidizing the older mortga-
gor who benefits from preinflation costs.""'
In addition to this portfolio lag, mortgage lending institutions
have had serious trouble attracting capital into the mortgage mar-
ket. Typically, these lending institutions have obtained mortgage
capital by offering short-term liquid deposits such as on-demand,
interest-bearing savings accounts. The lenders thereby assumed
the risk of interest rate fluctuations by using the interest payments
made on the long-term mortgage to provide a riskless, or guaran-
teed, rate of return to the depositors on a fairly liquid savings in-
strument."3 As long as the interest received from the mortgages
was enough to provide an attractive rate of return on the deposits,
capital would flow into the mortgage market. During the 1970's
and early 1980's, however, the low mortgage interest payments
from old FRM's have not been sufficient to pay the current high
market interest rates required to attract new capital into
nies and Pension Funds in Financing Real Estate in the 80s, in FINANCING REAL ESTATE
DURING THE INFLATIONARY 80s 1 (B. Strum ed. 1981); Hyer & Kearl, supra note 4, at 212 n.2.
8. As of December 1980, only 7.2% of the mortgage portfolios of federally chartered
S&L's consisted of alternative mortgage instruments. Thus, apparently 93% of their portfo-
lios consisted of FRM's. Dalton, supra note 1, at 71. Since other lenders also provided pri-
marily FRM's, their portfolios should have a similar ratio to that of the S&L's.
9. Although designed to produce an acceptable yield over the term of the loan, even
when the yield is adjusted for inflation, the return is far below what was expected. Strum,
Long-Term Fixed Rate Mortgages, in FINANCING REAL ESTATE DURING THE INFLATIONARY
80s 23 (B. Strum ed. 1981).
10. Levin & Roberts, Future Forms of Financing-Lending Devices Addressed to Infla-
tion and Tight Money, in FINANCING REAL ESTATE DURING THE INFLATIONARY 80s 31 n.3 (B.
Strum ed. 1981).
11. Id. at 31.
12. Iezman, Alternative Mortgage Instruments: Their Effect on Residential Financing,
10 REAL EST. L.J. 3, 4 (1981).
13. Hyer & Kearl, supra note 4, at 212-13.
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deposits:14
This process of disintermediation, which periodically ravages
thrift institutions, may result in insolvency and credit (mortgage)
rationing, reducing mortgage availability and interrupting the or-
derly accumulation of housing capital. Moreover, those who main-
tain deposits with these institutions, either because they are small
savers or lack adequate knowledge about alternatives, find their
savings eroded by below market (and often below inflation) inter-
est rates.'5
Two additional problems facing the lending institutions stem
from restrictive government regulation of the banking community
and government competition for capital funds. Regulation Q16 im-
poses deposit interest rate ceilings on savings institutions, thus
preventing interest rate competition with unregulated investments.
In the early 1980's, Congress began its attempt to deregulate the
banking industry by 1986,"v manifesting this intent by allowing
lending institutions to compete for needed capital. Optimism gen-
erated by government deregulation is offset in part, however, by
increasing competition for existing capital from the government it-
self. In order to fund the public debt, the United States Treasury
Department offers short-term riskless Treasury Bills at market in-
terest rates. Although these Treasury Bills are issued in large de-
nominations, small savers can now participate through certificates
of deposit or pooled investment plans.18 Thus, many who formerly
14. Significantly, much of the major competition for the investment capital for mort-
gages may come from debt-oriented corporations which must modernize their plants and
equipment and invest in new technologies. An example of this capital-intensive moderniza-
tion is our efforts to increase the nation's energy independence. Dalton, supra note 1, at 50.
15. Hyer & Kearl, supra note 4, at 213 (footnote omitted). See also Goldman, Dis-
intermediation Under the Microscope, 8 FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD J. 13 (Dec. 1975);
Verkuil, Perspectives on Reform of Financial Institutions, 83 YALE L.J. 1349, 1353 (1974).
16. 12 C.F.R. §§ 526.1-.9 (1981).
17. See The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 202(b), 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (94 Stat.) 142 (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 3501 (1980)). In addition, the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 allowed fed-
eral S&L's and national banks the capability of issuing "Savings Certificates" that provide a
tax-free interest return. Theoretically, the tax-free return should be competitive with the
taxed market return from other instruments, at least above a certain tax bracket, thus at-
tracting that mortgage capital to the S&L's. More important is the requirement that a per-
centage of the funds received from the certificates is required to be used by the institutions
for residential property financing. See The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-34, § 301(a) (Aug. 23, 1981) (to be printed at 95 Stat. 172, 267-68) (published at 6 U.S.
CODE. CONG. & AD. NEWS 1, 98 (1981)).
18. Many of the money market plans require only a low initial investment (e.g. $2000).
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kept their savings in S&L's, thereby providing needed capital, have
abandoned the S&L's for the more lucrative Treasury Bills.
To remedy inadequate capital accumulation in the mortgage
lending market, the secondary mortgage market was created.'9
Generally, mortgages are delivered to the secondary mortgage mar-
kets after being pooled by the original lender. The pooled mort-
gages are then used to back a guaranteed security instrument
which can be sold to investors in lieu of mortgages. Mortgage capi-
tal is thus attracted to the lending institutions from investment-
oriented organizations such as pension funds and insurance
companies.10
The result of this competition for funds has left regulated lend-
ers such as S&L's in a poor position to attract new capital into the
mortgage markets. In the residential mortgage market, this
shortage of funds has left many potential homeowners without a
source of financing, thereby damaging the construction industry.2"
To exacerbate the problem, the demand for housing will dramati-
cally increase during the current decade:
The coming of age of the "baby boom" generation will generate a
need for about 22 million new dwelling units during the 1980's,
compared to 17.5 million units during the past decade. Some 43
million Americans will be reaching the age of thirty during the
1980's compared with 32 million during the 1970's. In addition, an
accelerating divorce rate, greater longevity, and increased house-
19. There are three federally sponsored secondary mortgage market agencies. The Fed-
eral National Mortgage Association (FNMA) was established in 1938 to provide a secondary
market for FHA mortgages (and eventually VA mortgages), as well as to satisfy other hous-
ing needs. In 1968, the Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) was also cre-
ated to assist in specialized housing needs, as well as to create a new instrument called the
"mortgage-backed pass-through security" to help tap the capital markets. Finally, in 1970,
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) was chartered to continue creat-
ing and developing a secondary market in conventional mortgages. The success of these
agencies has attracted private mortgage lenders to participate in the secondary mortgage
market. See Dalton, supra note 1, at 62-64. See generally Comment, supra note 2, at 218-
27; Browne, Alternative Mortgage Instruments, in MORTGAGES AND ALTERNATE MORTGAGE
INSTRUMENTS 437, 446-61 (R. Sweat ed. 1981).
20. It is important to note that the yield on the securities depends upon the quality and
return of the mortgages backing the security. The problems of an uncertain return and
nonuniformity among instruments may result in the new mortgages being unpopular in the
secondary mortgage market. The secondary market institutions, however, have promoted
programs aimed at purchasing several types of alternative mortgage instruments. Dalton,
supra note 1, at 66. See Scheuerman, Adjustable Rate Mortgages: Fundamental New Di-
rections in Residential Mortgage Lending (pts. 1,2), 1981 FLA. B.J. 649, 737. See generally
Browne, supra note 19, at 446-61.
21. Dalton, supra note 1, at 49.
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hold formation by singles and those living in nontraditional ar-
rangements have added to the demand for housing."
The problems of rising housing demand, disintermediation, and
competition for capital highlight the significant need for alterna-
tives to conventional FRM's. These problems have led to extensive
experimentation in alternative mortgage instruments by both
traditional and nontraditional lenders. New, more flexible mort-
gage instruments that continuously adjust to reflect current mar-
ket rates are needed to solve many of the problems facing the
mortgage lending industry. The Board twice attempted to author-
ize such a Variable Rate Mortgage (VRM) in the early and mid-
1970's, but congressional pressure forced the new instruments to
be withdrawn." By the mid-1970's, however, many states had au-
thorized the use of mortgage instruments that provided for varia-
ble interest rates or adjustable payments. 4 Finally, in 1976, the
Board began an in-depth systematic review and analysis of several
types of new mortgage instruments. The Alternative Mortgage In-
strument Research Study" initially focused on two problem areas:
first, the inflexibility of the FRM for "lenders who cannot adjust
their earnings to accommodate the rising cost of funds"" and sec-
ond, "the need for new mortgage forms to meet the wide diversity
of financial requirements facing those borrowers at different points
in their financial life cycles.' 7
As a result of the study, the Board in 1979 authorized federally
chartered S&L's to use several different mortgage instruments that
were tailored to meet the various needs of the parties involved."' In
22. Id. at 50.
23. The first proposal was made in 1972, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,021 (1972), but was rejected the
next year, 38 Fed. Reg. 17,023 (1973). The next proposal followed two years later, 40 Fed.
Reg. 6870 (1975), but was similarly rejected, 40 Fed. Reg. 51,414 (1975). See Hyer & Kearl,
supra note 4, at 221 n.27.
24. See Thomas, Alternative Residential Mortgages for Tomorrow, 26 PRAC. LAW. 55, 56
(Sept. 1980); Hyer & Kearl, supra note 4, at 221 n.30.
25. The findings and contributions to the study are published in a three volume set:
ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE INSTRUMENT RESEARCH STUDY (D. Kaplan ed. 1977).
26. Dalton, supra note 1, at 52.
27. Id.
28. The Variable Rate Mortgage (VRM) "was developed to help shift the distribution of
interest-rate risk in order to better match the yield on associations' assets and liabilities."
Id. The Graduated Payment Mortgage (GPM) was designed to help upwardly mobile, first-
time homebuyers purchase a house with financing that matched payments to their rising
income. The Reverse Annuity Mortgage (RAM) helps older homeowners receive annuity
payments based on the built-up equity in their house. Id. All of the mortgage instruments
will be discussed more fully in part III.
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1980, the Board authorized the use of the Renegotiable Rate Mort-
gage that provided for a renewable loan of three to five years dura-
tion, yet amortized and secured by a long-term mortgage.2 Other
instruments were proposed and considered in 1980 that offered
variations on the basic variable rate mortgage concept.30 In April
1981, many of these proposals were consolidated into the most sig-
nificant regulation of the Board to date: the Adjustable Mortgage
Loan (AML).31 The AML is a comprehensive instrument that em-
bodies features of the Variable Rate Mortgage and Renegotiable
Rate Mortgage instruments as well as improvements to them."
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Comptroller) has
issued a similar regulation allowing national banks to offer Adjust-
able Rate Mortgages (ARM's)." As with the Board's AML regula-
tion, the Comptroller's regulation recognized the need for flex-
ibility in mortgage instruments: "Rather than specifying a single
mortgage instrument, the Office proposed that all national banks
be authorized to design adjustable-rate mortgage loans that meet
their needs and those of their customers." 4
In October 1981, the Board provided an ironic twist to this mort-
gage saga by amending its balloon payments loan regulation to
"permit federally-chartered thrift institutions to make non-amor-
tized and partially-amortized home loans in amounts not exceeding
ninety-five percent of the value of the property securing the
loan." 5 From the amortization problems of the Depression that
originally led to the creation of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, 6 the Board is again sanctioning the same balloon mortgage
instrument that caused those initial problems. The situation has
come full circle: once again the borrower will assume the risk of
29. 45 Fed. Reg. 24,108 (1980) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a).
30. The Graduated Payment Adjustable Mortgage (GPAM) was proposed in 1980, 45
Fed. Reg. 66,798 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4c) (proposed Oct. 8, 1980); in 1981, the
Board authorized its use, 46 Fed. Reg. 37,625 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4b).
This instrument was designed to combine the best features of the variable rate and gradu-
ated payment mortgages. However, the Shared Appreciation Mortgage (SAM) was proposed
in September 1980. As of December 1981, no further action had been taken on the proposal
(other than to extend the comment period), and no effort has been made to withdraw the
proposal. See 45 Fed. Reg. 66,801 (1980).
31. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,148 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a).
32. "The AML regulation replaces existing provisions authorizing Federally-chartered
thrift institutions to issue RRM's (12 C.F.R. 545.6-4(a)) and VRM's (12 C.F.R. 545.6-
4(c)(1980))." 46 Fed. Reg. 24,149 (1981).
33. 46 Fed. Reg. 18,932 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 29).
34. Id.
35. 46 Fed. Reg. 51,893 (1981) (amending 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-2).
36. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
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economic fluctuations and financial disaster so that the mortgage
industry can succeed. It is imperative that borrowers, lenders, at-
torneys, financial planners, and politicians understand the ramifi-
cations of the assumptions of this risk.
III. THE NEW MORTGAGE INSTRUMENTS
A traditional FRM generally consists of three components:3a the
principal,8 8 the interest rate,89 and the amortization period.'0
These three components are elements of a formula that, when ap-
plied, automatically calculates a fixed payment amount which is
designed to repay fully the principal and interest charges over the
amortization period.'1 Since the payments involved were the result
of a fairly rigidly applied formula of three variables, any desire to
modify the payment required the modification of one or more of
the variables. This modification was typically performed during
the negotiations for the mortgage, but once resolved and a fixed
payment determined, the payment became binding on the bor-
rower and lender for the life of the loan. Any alteration in the pay-
ment amount (through a modification of one of the three ele-
ments)'2 required the dissolution of the old mortgage agreement
and the creation of a new one, a process commonly called the refi-
nancing of the loan.
In order to provide the flexibility that is required by the current
mortgage market, the new mortgage instruments allow the varia-
37. See Hyer & Kearl, supra note 4, at 217 for a different breakdown of the elements of
a mortgage.
38. For the purpose of this discussion, "principal" will refer to the amount of money
originally loaned to the borrower and decreased through an amortized payment schedule. A
separate term, "loan balance," will be used to describe the amount upon which interest is
charged. Under the new mortgages, the "loan balance" may consist of unpaid principal and
unpaid interest. Although it is arguable that "principal" should be defined as the "loan
balance," the definition used here corresponds to tax considerations. See infra note 187 and
accompanying text.
39. The interest rate as applied to the loan balance will determine the amount the bor-
rower is charged for the use of the lender's money.
40. The amortization period is the amount of time over which the payments are calcu-
lated so that the entire principal and interest is repaid.
41. With P representing the principal amount, i the interest, and A the amortization
period, the payment equation is:
i
payment =x P12 _hne !1 + i) "A
42. Changes in the amortization period typically are not an effective means to modify
payments since the resulting change is typically small. See Hyer & Kearl, supra note 4, at
216 n.15; Strum, Economics of Variable Rate Mortgages, in FINANCING REAL ESTATE DURING
THE INFLATIONARY 808 25-26 (B. Strum ed. 1981).
THE NEW MORTGAGES
bility of any of the three elements without refinancing. These vari-
ations are either calculated into the payments formula (such as a
change in the amortization period), or are tied to an external factor
that varies independently from any control by one of the parties."'
An additional variation involves the creation of a loan term that is
shorter than the amortization period. This is similar to the refi-
nancing requirements of a FRM, since the balance of the mortgage
must either be repaid in full at the end of the loan term or must be
refinanced using a new market rate of interest. However, a fourth
possible modification is to the method of payment. The methods of
payment variation include all forms of delaying or manipulating
payments of either interest or principal so that the periodic pay-
ments fit the financial plans of both the borrower and lender."
Thus, changes can be effected through the principal, interest
rate, amortization period, or method of payments. Since this opens
up such a varied range of possible mortgage instruments, several
broad areas of law and regulation must also be addressed. For the
institutional lenders (such as those regulated by the Board and the
Comptroller), a conflict arises between retaining some control over
these new instruments to protect the parties involved, or allowing
unregulated instruments so as not to inhibit the beneficial flow of
funds through the mortgage market.
It is significant to note that these "new" instruments are actu-
ally new only to the residential real estate market. Commercial
mortgages have continually provided instruments that allow varia-
tions on each of the elements. 5 In the future, residential borrowers
will be assuming the same interest rate risk that the commercial
borrowers have always had as part of their doing business. To pro-
tect the borrowers in this transfer of risk, the regulating agencies
have proceeded slowly and cautiously through progressively more
complex mortgage instruments. This slow procession has also been
necessitated by the foundation of laws and regulations that have
been built up around the FRM since the Depression.
To simplify the following analysis of the new mortgage instru-
43. For example, a variable or renegotiable rate mortgage involves a variable interest
rate that is tied to an inflation-oriented index.
44. Generally, any mortgage device that is tied to a price level index may be regarded as
adjustable for inflation. Any instrument containing modifications to payments may be re-
garded as a convenience device. See generally Cowan & Foley, New Trends in Residential
Mortgage Finance, 13 RzAL PROP. PROB. & Ti. J. 1075 (1978); Barnett, Alternative Mort-
gage Instruments: How to Maintain Secured Lender Status, 96 BANKING L.J. 6 (1979).
45. See Iezman, supra note 12, at 4.
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ments, each mortgage will be described by identifying the imple-
mentation of the four elements of the mortgage and how they are
varied. Many of the following mortgages may also be offered by
state-chartered or private mortgage institutions in a somewhat dif-
ferent form. The following discussion will present only a general
format of the various types of loans, with the Board's and the
Comptroller's regulations used as examples when appropriate."
These regulations can be used as complete models for the drafting
and subsequent analysis of any new mortgage instrument. In addi-
tion, the generic regulations recently adopted by the Board and
Comptroller will be presented. Once the instruments have been de-
fined, the general legal issues, as well as the issues pertaining to
variations of any mortgage element, will be discussed.
A. The Board's and the Comptroller's Regulations
Perhaps the most significant mortgage instrument regulations of
the early 1980's have been the broad regulations promulgated by
the Board and the Comptroller. 47 In March 1981, the Comptroller
issued its Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) regulation that estab-
lished a "framework within which all national banks may make
and purchase residential mortgage loans which carry an interest
rate subject to periodic adjustment." 8 The twofold purpose behind
the regulation was "to help ensure the availability of mortgage
funds by facilitating the development of new instruments respon-
sive to changing interest rates and bank deposit structures" and
to provide "for the protection of borrowers by requiring disclosures
designed to facilitate their understanding and by moderating the
frequency and magnitude of potential rate increases." 0 One month
46. For examples of similar California mortgage instruments, see Iezman, supra note 12,
at 6-25. See also Scheuerman, supra note 20, at 737-38 for examples of specific implementa-
tion of the Board's adjustable mortgage plan.
47. Since these new mortgages are likely to be the most frequently used in the future, as
well as being the most recent, a more detailed discussion is provided. See generally Parks,
Adjustable-Rate Mortgages-New Regulations for National Banks and Federal Savings
and Loan Associations, 70 ILL. B.J. 126 (1981).
48. 46 Fed. Reg. 18,932 (1981). The Comptroller rejected a specific mortgage instrument
because the "economic and market conditions in the various locales and the needs of bor-
rowers and lenders alike are simply too varied to be satisfied by a single contract." Federal
Role in Conventional Home Financing: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Ur-
ban Affairs of the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 82
(1981) (statement of Cantwell F. Muckenfuss III, Senior Deputy Comptroller for Policy,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) [hereinafter cited as Muckenfuss].
49. 46 Fed. Reg. 18,932 (1981).
50. Id.
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later, the Board promulgated a similar regulation that authorized
federal S&L's and mutual savings banks to "make, purchase, par-
ticipate or otherwise deal in adjustable mortgage loan instruments,
which permit adjustment of the interest rate."5 1 The Alternative
Mortgage Loan (AML) regulation further defines the possible
methods of rate adjustment as those "implemented through
changes in the payment amount, the outstanding principal loan
balance, and the term of the loan, provided that the term never
exceeds 40 years." 52 Both regulations are designed to provide lend-
ing institutions with the maximum flexibility in designing instru-
ments that provide a variable current market return to the lenders,
while at the same time protecting the borrowers from unforeseen
changes that may effectively destroy their financial plans.
Generally, the Comptroller's ARM rule and the Board's AML
rule provide for the following method of mortgage innovation. To
allow the lenders the capability to charge and receive a return over
the life of the loan that reflects current market rates, the interest
charged must be allowed to fluctuate according to variations in the
market rate. This variable rate will be determined periodically by
comparison to a pre-specified index.63 Once the new rate is deter-
mined and notice given, the payment amount will be adjusted to
reflect the new interest rate." The improvement upon the previous
Variable Rate Mortgage and Renegotiable Rate Mortgage instru-
ments of the Board is in the method of payment of the higher in-
terest rate.5 5 The rules allow the increased interest charge to be
added to the loan balance, instead of being immediately repaid as
part of the periodic repayment." Another method of modifying the
increased interest charge is through the adjustment of the loan
term.6
7
51. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,148 (1981).
52. Id.
53. The Comptroller's ARM rule specifies the use of three possible indexes. See 46 Fed.
Reg. 18,943 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 29.4). The Board's AML rule provides for
similar indexes, yet allows an additional index to be used that is based on the Board's re-
gional cost of funds. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,152 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a(c)(2)).
54. A 30-day notice is required to give the borrower the opportunity to search for al-
ternate financing if desired. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,152 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-
4a(e)).
55. See infra note 59.
56. This process is called "negative amortization" and occurs when the loan balance in-
creases instead of decreases over the life of the loan. Note that this amount can increase as
the result of the addition of unpaid interest, or through a readjustment of the actual loan
balance. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
57. However, under the Board's ARM rule, the total loan term cannot extend more than
1982]
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In most respects, the two regulations are similar in their attitude
towards interest variability, except that the Comptroller's ARM
rule provides for specific limitations on the frequency of the inter-
est rate changes and the maximum and minimum amounts of a
periodic increase;5 8 the Board's AML rule establishes no specific
limit for these changes. 59 An additional difference between the two
rules exists in the area of disclosure to the borrower. The Comp-
troller's ARM rule requires extensive disclosure to the borrower of
general information about the ARM, key terms, an explanation of
the rate change limitations, and the identification and past per-
formance of the index that is to be used.60 Additionally, the disclo-
sure must include a worst-case scenario of potential interest rate
increases and how future payments would be affected. 1 This dis-
closure is crucial to the ARM instrument:
Because the regulation relies primarily on disclosure rather
than restriction of ARM terms to provide for borrower protection,
the Office will view failure to provide timely and substantively
complete and correct disclosures as a serious violation of the reg-
ula ion [sic]. The full range of the Office's available supervisory
authority will be used to assure compliance with the disclosure
40 years. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,152 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a(b)).
58. 46 Fed. Reg. 18,943 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 29.5(a)-(c)). Although there
are periodic rate change regulations, there are no prohibitions on the total rate increase over
the life of the loan. See id.
59. A major criticism of the Board's previous VRM and RRM regulations was that the
rate change limitations imposed by them were too restrictive and resulted in the lenders not
being able to receive a market return on their investment. See Scheuerman, supra note 20,
at 650. However, the Board recognizes the need for limitations, and feels these will be im-
posed by the marketplace:
The Board is firmly of the opinion that AML's will contain a variety of payment
caps and rate-change limitations even though not required by regulation. Lenders,
who have an interest in ensuring that borrowers meet scheduled payments, are
aware that such constraints make economic sense in a time of volatile interest
rates. Thus, from the lender's point of view, some form of payment or rate-change
limitation may be the surest way of simplifying underwriting of the loan. More
importantly, borrower resistance to a totally unlimited mortgage instrument could
render such an instrument unmarketable. Finally, third parties such as mortgage
insurers and secondary market purchasers will likely exert pressure that will result
in market limitations on AML's. The Board believes that competition and other
factors in the mortgage market will encourage lenders to compete on terms and
conditions that will best serve all parties involved, and that the mortgage market
is competitive enough to produce the appropriate constraints.
46 Fed. Reg. 24,150 (1981).
60. 46 Fed, Reg. 18,944-45 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 29.8(a)(1)-(3)).
61. Id. at 18,944 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 29.8(a)(9)).
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provisions of the final rule.""
The Board's AML disclosure rule, by contrast, is not as strict,
providing only an outline of the requirements of disclosure as op-
posed to the model disclosure form of the Comptroller's rule."
There is no requirement to provide either a performance history of
the chosen index or a worst-case scenario. The only specific re-
quirement is to "[s]et out an example of the operation of the type
of AML to be offered to the borrower, including, where appropri-
ate, the use of a table."64 To remedy this incomplete disclosure, the
Board has included in the general description section of the disclo-
sure form a statement that instructs the borrower that there are no
federal regulations that place any limitations on rate adjustments:
This does not mean that the particular loan agreement you sign
must, by law, permit unlimited interest-rate changes. It merely
means that, if you desire to have certain rate-adjustment limita-
tions placed in your loan agreement, that is a matter you should
negotiate with the lender. You may also want to make inquiries
concerning the loan terms offered by other lenders on AMLs to
compare the terms and conditions.6 5
B. Other Mortgage Instruments
The broad mortgage loan regulations promulgated by the Board
and the Comptroller will most likely provide the basis for guide-
lines in most of the residential mortgage loans in the near future.
Many of the popularly named mortgages may now be replaced by
the generic titles of the Board's AML or the Comptroller's ARM
instruments. However, the following listing identifies several of the
most common new mortgages and defines them by their individual
operation on each of the four elements of a mortgage instrument."
Fixed Rate Mortgage (FRM). The FRM has a fixed interest rate
and a declining principal that is amortized typically over a thirty-
62. Id. at 18,940.
63. See 46 Fed. Reg. 24,152-53 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a(f)).
64. Id. at 24,153. This provision has been slightly modified by a subsequent amendment,
46 Fed. Reg. 37,627 (1981) (revising 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a(f)).
65. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,153 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 545.6-4a(f)). See also supra
note 59.
66. See also Sweat, supra note 4, at 13-41. Although similar mortgage instruments may
be given different names by the various lenders, the Board's nomenclature has generally
been followed.
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year period. The term of the mortgage is the same as the amortiza-
tion period. Since the elements are fixed, a constant payment
schedule can be calculated."7
Variable Rate Mortgage (VRM). The VRM has an interest rate
that is tied to an index that generally reflects the current market
rate, resulting in fluctuating payment amounts that consist of the
variable interest and the declining, fully amortized mortgage prin-
cipal. In 1979, the Board issued a regulation allowing federally
chartered S&L's to offer VRM's.68 The regulation contained limita-
tions on the size and frequency of any variations of the interest
rate,6 9 as well as requirements for extensive disclosure to the bor-
rowers of the variable features of the mortgage and a side-by-side
presentation of fixed and variable rate mortgages. Significantly, the
Board's VRM has been superseded by the Adjustable Mortgage
Loan regulation, thus allowing a VRM-type mortgage without all
of the disclosure previously required.70
Renegotiable Rate Mortgage (RRM). The RRM has also been
called the "rollover" mortgage.7 1 The RRM is essentially the same
as the VRM with a variable interest rate and a principal that is
amortized over a long-term period. However, the RRM is an auto-
matically renewable series of short-term loans. Upon renewal, gen-
erally the only alteration that can be made is in the interest rate.7 2
Although the Board authorized the use of RRM's in 1980,8 subse-
quent amendments to the Board's RRM regulation rendered the
instrument virtually identical to the Variable Rate Mortgage.74 As
with the Variable Rate Mortgage, the Board specifically replaced
the RRM with its AML regulation.7
Graduated Payment Mortgage (GPM). The GPM is a long-term,
67. See supra note 41.
68. 44 Fed. Reg. 32,199 (1979) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4(c)). See generally
Thomas, supra note 24, at 55; Comment, Variable Rate Mortgages: Texas Savings & Loan
Associations Authorized to Offer Flexible Financing Alternatives, 12 ST. MARY's L.J. 1144
(1981).
69. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4(c)(4) (1981).
70. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,149 (1981).
71. Dalton, supra note 1, at 54.
72. See generally Iezman, supra note 12, at 12-13; Comment, Renegotiable Rate Mort-
gages: Keeping Pace with a Fluctuating Economy and Equalizing Competition within the
Home Financing Industry, 10 STETSON L. REv. 293 (1981).
73. 45 Fed. Reg. 24,108 (1980) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a).
74. 45 Fed. Reg. 67,059 (1980) (amending 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a); see also 45 Fed. Reg.
82,161 (1980). These changes were made as the result of the intervening lien problems asso-
ciated with a series of loans. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
75. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,149 (1981).
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fixed interest rate mortgage with payments set at an initial level
that is insufficient to amortize completely the principal over the
loan term. These payments increase, or graduate, over time76 to a
point at which the payment level is sufficient to amortize fully the
remaining loan balance over the unexpired loan term." The GPM
has been authorized by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board78 and
the Federal Housing Administration'7  among others. Generally,
the lenders are required to maintain an initial loan-to-value ratio
sufficient to protect against a negative amortization build-up of the
loan balance that is greater than the value of the mortgaged prop-
erty.80 Restrictions on yearly payment increases, negative amorti-
zation periods, and disclosure may also be imposed.8 1
Graduated Payment Adjustable Mortgage (GPAM). The GPAM
has an adjustable interest rate that is tied to a pre-specified index
and a payment schedule that negatively amortizes the loan bal-
ance. This loan effectively combines the "adjustable-rate feature of
the RRM as well as the limitations on annual payment increases
contained in the graduated payment mortgage (GPM) regula-
tion. '8 2 The Board's GPAM regulation was promulgated after the
Board's AML regulation. Although the AML regulation could have
incorporated a GPAM arrangement within its restrictions, "it was
felt that all of the implications of such an amalgamation had not
yet been fully explored."83 Therefore, the Board determined that
the AML regulation should include payment, principal, or term ad-
justments only if the adjustments result from interest rate
changes.8 Similarly, the GPAM instrument includes payment ad-
76. This increase in payments is made through "negative amortization," an increase, in-
stead of decrease, in the loan balance. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
77. "The graduated payment mortgage (GPM) enables new home buyers to borrow
funds with monthly payments which begin low and increase over time with increases in the
borrowers' monthly income." Iezman, supra note 12, at 8 (footnote omitted); see also Dal-
ton, supra note 1, at 53.
78. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4(b) (1981).
79. 24 C.F.R. § 203.45 (1981). See Iezman, supra note 12, at 8-9.
80. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4(b)(5) (1981). Note that this limitation has since been
eased by the Board. 46 Fed. Reg. 37,626 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a(b)(3)).
81. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4(b). The Board deleted some of the payment restrictions
and disclosure requirements from its GPM regulation to allow more flexibility for the mort-
gage instruments. See 46 Fed. Reg. 37,627 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-
4(b)(4)).
82. 46 Fed. Reg. 37,625 (1981) (citation omitted). For an example of the payment sched-
ule of a GPAM, see Iezman, supra note 12, at 11.
83. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,151 (1981).
84. Id. One major difference between the AML and GPAM regulations is the limitation
imposed on permissible negative amortization growth. See Scheuerman, supra note 20, at
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justments that result from interest rate changes, but also allows
planned payment adjustments that are independent of any interest
rate changes. The Comptroller and other lenders have referred to
this instrument as the Payment-Capped Mortgage (PCM).8 5 In the
PCM, payments are capped over a certain period, yet the interest
rate is allowed to adjust over a shorter period according to an in-
dex, resulting in fluctuating negative amortization increases.
Reverse Annuity Mortgages (RAM). The RAM is designed to
provide homeowners the financial means to draw upon the accu-
mulated equity in a home as a source of income. The basic opera-
tion allows for the purchase of an annuity with the equity. This
annuity would then provide for payments to the borrower, nor-
mally over the lifetime of the borrower. The RAM was originally
designed for elderly homeowners who desired retirement income or
an income supplement."' Although there are several different for-
mats of the RAM, it is atypical of the new residential mortgages
that provide variations on interest, principal, and payment.87
Pledged Account Mortgage (PAM). The PAM is a long-term,
generally fixed-interest loan that provides graduated payments for
the borrower similar to the GPM, but also allows the lender to re-
ceive a fixed income stream. The deficiency is satisfied through the
use of a supplementary annuity stream that accrues from a pledg-
ed interest-bearing savings account established at the time of down
payment. This pledged account thus replaces the necessity for neg-
ative amortization of a graduated payment instrument.8 8
Balloon Payment Mortgage (BPM). The BPM is a short-term,
partially or non-amortized, fixed-interest mortgage.8 9 There is no
guarantee of refinancing at the end of the loan term. The BPM
was the primary mortgage instrument used before the Depres-
sion.90 Because of the potential for payment on demand at the end
653.
85. See 46 Fed. Reg. 18,933 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 29.9); Scheuerman,
supra note 20, at 652, 738.
86. Dalton, supra note 1, at 53.
87. See Iezman, supra note 12, at 24; 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4(d) (1981). The Board has re-
cently amended its RAM regulation. See 46 Fed. Reg. 51,897 (1981) (amending 12 C.F.R. §
545.6-4(c)).
88. See generally Iezman, supra note 12, at 17; Dalton, supra note 1, at 55; 12 C.F.R. §
545.6-2(a)(5) (1981).
89. The Board has permitted the authorization of BPM's for federally chartered thrift
institutions. 46 Fed. Reg. 51,893 (1981) (amending 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4(c)). The Comptroller
has included BPM's as part of its ARM regulation. 46 Fed. Reg. 18,944 (1981) (to be codi-
fied at 12 C.F.R. § 29.8(c)). See also Scheuerman, supra note 20, at 652.
90. See supra note 3, and accompanying text.
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of the loan term and the risk involved, prominent disclosure is usu-
ally required."
Shared Appreciation Mortgage (SAM). The SAM offers a lower-
than-market fixed interest rate and a fixed payment schedule in
exchange for a percentage of the future appreciated value of the
property upon resale or reappraisal. s The SAM is similar to a
BPM in that the term of the loan is shorter than the amortization
period, and as such requires a full payment or refinancing of the
loan principal and accrued interest at the end of the term. The
amount received from the appreciation is regarded as contingent
interest s for two reasons: First, since the appreciated value may
provide a return well in excess of a state's usury ceiling, the fact
that the interest received is contingent upon an event not within
the lender's control provides the lender with protection from any
usury implications;95 second, the specification that the appreciation
proceeds are interest, and thus payment for the use of money, pro-
tects the loan arrangement from being viewed as an equity invest-
ment in the underlying property."
Superficially, the SAM would appear to be an attractive instru-
ment to both borrowers, who pay lower interest rates than in other
alternative mortgages, and lenders, who potentially could receive a
greater-than-market rate of return if the property appreciates sig-
nificantly. Several unique problems arise with a SAM, however,
that mitigate its popularity. These include uncertain returns,9 7 ap-
91. See, e.g., 46 Fed. Reg. 18,944-45 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 29.8(c)). But see
FLA. STAT. § 697.05 (Supp. 1981).
92. The Board proposed the authorization of SAM's for all federal S&L's in October
1980; however, as of December 1981, no further action had been taken. See 45 Fed. Reg.
66,801 (1980) (proposed Oct. 8, 1980); McKenzie, A Comprehensive Look at Shared-Appre-
ciation Mortgages, 13 FED. HomE LOAN BANK BOARD J. 11 (Nv. 1980); Dalton, supra note
1, at 60. See generally Iezman, supra note 12, at 19-23; Strum, An Introduction to Shared
Appreciation Mortgages, reprinted in FINANCING REAL ESTATE DURING THE INFLATIONARY
80s 27 (B. Strum ed. 1981); Levin & Roberts, supra note 10, at 43-49. Note that to the
extent property appreciation corresponds with inflation the SAM may be regarded as an
indexed mortgage. See McKenzie, supra, at 12.
Typically, the loan term for a SAM will be shorter than the amortization period, resulting
in a balloon payment requiring refinancing if no resale occurs before the end of the loan
term. Id. at 11.
93. 45 Fed. Reg. 66,802-03 (1980).
94. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
95. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
96. 45 Fed. Reg. 66,803 (1980). The issues of equity investment, joint ventureship, etc.
give rise to foreclosure and tax problems. See Levin & Roberts, supra note 10, at 46-47;
Levine, Tax Implications of Shared Appreciation Mortgages, 59 TAxES 487, 492 (1981). See
also Iezman, Shared Appreciation Mortgage, 4 L.A. LAW. 24, 44 (May 1981).
97. For a detailed economic analysis of a SAM, see Freiberg, The Problem with SAM:
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preciation appraisal,98 and payment of the contingent interest."
Because of these problems, a SAM may be more popular with in-
vestment-oriented lenders than with institutional lenders bur-
dened with regulations that may inhibit the use of such
instruments.
Price Level Adjusted Mortgage (PLAM). A PLAM is a long-
term mortgage with a fixed interest rate but a principal level that
is tied to an inflation index.100 Since the principal is indexed for
inflation, the interest rate charged can theoretically be far below
the market rates, because an inflation premium need not be in-
cluded in the interest rate.101 The PLAM theoretically provides a
constant ratio between monthly payments and income, reflecting
payments in real dollars and not nominal dollars.102 Although this
instrument has been used in several high-inflation countries,103 it
An Economic and Policy Analysis, 1 HOUSING FIN. REv. 73 (Jan. 1982). In general, the
lender must trade a current reduced cash flow for a future lump sum return that is depen-
dent upon factors beyond the lender's control. If the property does not appreciate due to
economic conditions or borrower negligence, the lender may be stuck with a below-market
return. See generally McKenzie, supra note 92, at 12-13; Iezman, supra note 12, at 22-23;
Gallagher, Computing the Lender's Yield on an Equity Participation Mortgage, 41 MORT.
BANKER 33 (Feb. 1981); Iezman, The Shared Appreciation Mortgage and the Shared Eq-
uity Program: A Comprehensive Examination of Equity Participation, 16 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 510 (1981).
Many institutions may not allow such an investment in their portfolios because of the
variable return; for this reason the SAM may be more popular with non-institutional lend-
ers. See Iezman, supra note 12, at 21. The SAM also may not be popular in the secondary
market because of the unsure return and the difficulty in pooling SAM's. See Freiberg,
supra, at 73.
98. The Board proposed that the property appraisal should parallel Internal Revenue
Service methods in the case of a resale, or be performed by an appraiser, particularly if at
the end of the loan term. 45 Fed. Reg. 66,802-03 (1980). Nevertheless, several significant
problems arise with the Internal Revenue Service methods and with the independent ap-
praiser, such as borrower improvements, future financing, etc. See Levine, supra note 96, at
491-92; Iezman, supra note 12, at 22; Gallagher, The Effect of Financing Terms on Residen-
tial Property Values, 14 FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD J. 20 (June 1981); Levin & Roberts,
supra note 10, at 49.
99. Since the SAM is amortized over a period longer than the loan term, the contingent
interest amount may be due in one lump sum if no automatic refinancing is offered. Thus,
there is a risk that the borrower may have to pay a significant amount of interest based on
the unrealized appreciation of the property. See McKenzie, supra note 92, at 13; Iezman,
supra note 12, at 22. For a comparison of the SAM to a similar, yet improved mortgage
instrument, see Kling, Son of SAM: A Proposal for a Deferred-Payment Mortgage, 1 Hous-
ING FIN. REV. 93 (Jan. 1982).
100. See generally Cassidy, Price Level Adjusted Mortgages Versus Other Mortgage In-
struments, 14 FED. HoME LOAN BANK BOARD J. 3 (Jan. 1981); Cowan & Foley, supra note
44, at 1075; Iezman, supra note 12, at 25.
101. See Iezman, supra note 12, at 26.
102. Nominal dollars are those that are not adjusted for inflation.
103 See Iezman, supra note 12, at 25.
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has not been popular in the United States because of the usury
and indexed principal implications.1 04
IV. THE LEGAL ISSUES
The following discussion provides a general overview of the vari-
ous legal issues that impede or affect mortgage instrument innova-
tion. Each of the issues affect one or more of the four elements of a
mortgage and the method in which the element has been modified
to achieve innovation. Many of the legal issues are based on state
statutory and regulatory legislation; only a general approach to
these issues will be given as they relate to the mortgage instru-
ments described in part III. Some of the federal issues will be dis-
cussed in more detail. Because of the novelty of many of these
mortgages, however, dispositive judicial decisions are not available
to provide categorical interpretations. 05 Many of these issues also
involve the question of federal preemption of state legislation;
these issues similarly have not yet reached dispositive judicial
decision.'"
A. Usury
The concept of usury is ancient.'07 Until recently in the United
States, the responsibility for regulating usury had belonged to the
states.' 5 In 1980, however, Congress passed the Depository Institu-
tions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act' 09 for the purpose of
deregulating, or preempting, any state laws restricting interest rate
variability."0 The new federal system bases any interest ceilings
primarily on flexible market rates; therefore, lenders in all states
104. See infra notes 107 and 150 and accompanying text.
105. The reader should reference any applicable state statutes or regulations for a more
precise definition and identification of the issues in a specific state. See generally Winning,
Alternative Mortgage Instruments and Legal Issues Involved Therein, in MORTGAGES AND
ALTERNATE MORTGAGE INSTRUMENTS 503-15 (R. Sweat ed. 1981); Hyer & Kearl, supra note
4, at 211.
106. For a discussion of the ability of the federal government to preempt state law, see
Sweat, supra note 4, at 37-38; Comment, supra note 2, at 269-73.
107. Usury is basically the charging of excessive interest for a loan.
108. See Note, The Federal Monetary Control Act of 1980: A Step Toward Deregula-
tion of State Usury Laws, 83 W. VA. L. REv. 509, 510-16 (1981). See generally Comment,
supra note 2, at 211-74.
109. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-221, § 501, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (94 Stat.) 161 (1980) (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1735f-7 (1980)). This act has been implemented by the Board at 12 C.F.R. § 590
(1981).
110. Id.
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have an equal opportunity to attract mortgage capital and get a
market return on their investment."1 This preemption, though, is
subject to an opt-out provision by states that choose not to be held
under the federal standard.' 12 The preemption provisions outlined
in section 501 of the act apply to mortgage loans made by financial
institutions s as well as to the sale or exchange of any real prop-
erty by almost any individual, provided the property is owned and
occupied as his principal residence." 4
A second source of federal preemptive powers over usury is
claimed by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board:
[T]he Board codifies its view that the regulation is promulgated
pursuant to the Board's plenary and exclusive authority to regu-
late all aspects of the operations of Federally-chartered savings
and loan associations and mutual savings banks. As such, the
Board's exercise of this authority is preemptive of any state law
purporting to restrict the ability or right of any Federal associa-
tion or Federal savings bank to use adjustable mortgage loan
instruments." 5
This power has been upheld by at least one federal court in decid-
ing that a state's regulation of interest rate increases does not ap-
ply to a federal S&L since the Board's regulatory scheme was so
comprehensive as to preempt the field.'In spite of the federal adoption of a floating interest ceiling, sev-
eral potential problems remain with the new mortgage instru-
ments. 1 7 In general, usury will not be found if the mortgage agree-
ment is entered into in good faith with no intent to avoid the usury
laws.1 8 If a mortgage requires or results in negative amortization
of the principal, however, the resulting "interest on interest" might
cause the amount charged to be usurious. With the current provi-
sion by the Board to preempt any state law that prohibits negative
111. Id. § 521 (amending the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-32
(1976)). The Act sets the interest rate ceiling at not more than 1% in excess of the discount
rate on 90-day commercial paper.
112. Id. § 501(b)(2).
113. Id. § 501(a)(2)(A).
114. Id. § 501(a)(1)(C).
115. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,151 (1981).
116. Dantus v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 502 F. Supp. 658 (D. Col. 1980).
117. See generally Werner, Usury and the Variable Rate Mortgage, 5 REAL EsT. L.J.
155 (1976).
118. McConnell v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 146 Cal. Rptr. 371 (Cal.
1978).
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amortization," 9 it is doubtful that such compounded interest
would be regarded as usurious. But if any state opts out from the
federal deregulation policy, or if national banks are held to state
standards, 120 the traditional usury principles may still be valid. " '
There are several methods or defenses that can be used to get
around a usury allegation, provided it can be shown that the agree-
ment was entered into in good faith and with no intent to avoid
the usury statute. Initially, all lenders can protect themselves by
including provisions in the interest rate variation clause which
make the adjustment only at the option of the lender; the lender
subsequently would not increase the interest rate if the resulting
charge would be usurious. 122 Alternatively, an interest ceiling can
be included so that the interest charged is never greater than the
usurious rate. The problem with these methods is that they "un-
dermine the usefulness of these mortgages in states with low usury
ceilings and may complicate pricing these mortgages on the secon-
dary market."' "3
A second method is that of income averaging or spreading. By
prorating the loan costs over the life of the loan, a temporarily usu-
rious rate would be averaged so that the overall interest rate
charged would remain under the interest rate ceiling."' A problem
with the spreading notion is that courts may regard the rate ad-
justments as constituting separate periods of the loan, and thus
"non-spreadable," especially when interest is added to the loan
balance. Another problem arises when trying to determine the usu-
rious rate ceiling when the ceiling itself is fluctuating over the life
of the loan, as with the federal standard. Consequently, spreading
may not be a viable alternative for avoiding the usury statutes. 2 5
A third method is called the borrower control theory.1' Any in-
crease in the interest rate entitles the borrower to the option of
prepaying the loan instead of accepting the higher rate. Such a
contingency is within the control of the borrower, and may not
qualify as a usurious rate charged by the lender.12
119. See infra note 147.
120. Note, supra note 108, at 533.
121. It is important to note that usury laws varied from state to state prior to federal
preemption. See Hyer & Kearl, supra note 4, at 222-23.
122. Id. at 223.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 224.
125. Id. at 224-25.
126. Id. at 225; see Werner, supra note 117, at 160-61.
127. See Hyer & Kearl, supra note 4, at 225.
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A related method of avoidance is called the contingent interest
theory.1 28 This theory specifies that a lender can charge an interest
rate above the usury ceiling provided that the usurious interest is
contingent upon the occurrence of a specified condition. Even so,
the risk that the high interest will not be paid must be substantial
and must be one that is not ordinarily undertaken by the lender.
Before the federal preemption of usury ceilings, several courts held
that the risk of depreciation of the dollar is not especially hazard-
ous and is normally incident to every loan. Accordingly, the contin-
gent rule would not apply when the interest rate variation was tied
to the consumer price index. 129 On the contrary, another court held
that a lender may provide for a variable interest rate that may ex-
ceed the usurious rate, provided that the parties contracted in
good faith and without intent to avoid the usury laws.130 It would
appear that if the index chosen by the lender and borrower gener-
ally follows the variations of the federally established, fluctuating
interest rate ceiling, usury would not be found. "
With the intended shift of the inflation risk to the borrower in
the new variable rate mortgages, it is doubtful that an interest rate
that exceeds usury limits because of compounded interest will be
disallowed by the courts. This is especially true in light of Con-
gress' intent to deregulate usury laws.
B. Lien Priority
Generally, a mortgage is a contract that secures the underlying
debt through the imposition of a lien on the real property involved
in the transaction.1 3 2 A mortgage that is recorded will provide the
constructive notice necessary to protect the priority of the lien
against third parties.13 3 Yet the priority is protected only to the
extent that the debt is disclosed by the mortgage document. If
128. Id. at 226.
129. Olwine v. Torrens, 344 A.2d 665 (Pa. 1975); Aztec Properties, Inc. v. Union
Planter's Nat'l Bank, 530 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn. 1975), cert. denied 425 U.S. 975 (1976).
130. Arneill Ranch v. Petit, 134 Cal. Rptr. 456 (Cal. 1976).
131. A clearer application of the contingent interest theory arises in a SAM. The contin-
gent interest in a SAM is calculated by a percentage of the total appreciation of property
over a period of time. Although it is arguable that property appreciation generally follows
inflation, and is therefore an index similar to those used under the adjustable interest mort-
gages, many extrinsic factors beyond the lender's control can affect property appreciation.
See supra note 98.
132. See Sweat, supra note 4, at 17. See generally Guttman, Types of Adjustable Mort-
gages and Their Lien Priority, 1981 FLA. B.J. 552.
133. Guttmann, supra note 132, at 554.
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there is a change in any aspect of the mortgage agreement, the pri-
ority of the lien may be affected. "
Although the lien on the original principal and interest would be
unaffected by intervening liens, any adjustment to principal, inter-
est, or term might give an intervening lien priority over the new
adjustment.138 Any mortgage instrument that essentially consists
of a series of short-term notes' instead of a single long-term note
could be regarded as a refinancing or renegotiation of the agree-
ment. In such a case, "[a]ny liens intervening between the date of
recording the original mortgage and the recording of the renegoti-
ated loan would have priority over the renegotiated provisions
later appearing of record." ' A possible solution to this would be
to require the borrower, as a condition of refinancing, to satisfy or
subordinate any intervening liens.
Generally, the extension of the term of the mortgage would not
destroy the priority of the lien. 3 8 Yet the adjustment of the inter-
est rate might affect priority. If there is sufficient notice to a third
party that the interest rate charged is variable, that should be suf-
ficient to protect lien priority. 3 9 An additional safeguard would be
to include in the mortgage document the specification of the index
used so as to give even more precise notice.'"
Similarly, if the mortgage instrument includes an adjustment to
the loan balance,' 4 ' the situation becomes analogous to a future
advance.142 The status of lien priority for future advances depends
on whether the future advance is obligatory on the lender, or only
optional. If obligatory, the advance will retain priority; an optional
advance, however, will generally only have priority if the lender
does not have knowledge of any intervening liens.13 Therefore, to
134. Id. at 555.
135. Id.
136. The original RRM was essentially a series of short-term arrangements. See supra
note 74 and accompanying text.
137. Guttmann, supra note 132, at 555 (footnote omitted).
138. Id.
139. Hyer & Kearl, supra note 4, at 234.
140. Id. Note that this assumes the index used is an objective one (e.g., one specified by
the Board). See Guttmann, supra note 132, at 556.
141. An adjustment to the loan balance can be made either through negative amortiza-
tion, as in a GPM, GPAM, or PCM, or through the principal being directly tied to an index,
as in a PLAM.
142. A future advance is money that is advanced by the lender to the borrower after the
mortgage is executed, yet is also secured by the original mortgage. Hyer & Kearl, supra note
4, at 233. See generally G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES §§ 117-18 (2d
ed. 1970).
143. Hyer & Kearl, supra note 4, at 233. The law pertaining to optional advances varies
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protect fully lien priority in an area that treats adjustments to
principal and interest as analogous to future advances, 4 4 such in-
struments should be made obligatory and should be so specified in
the mortgage agreement. 14
C. Negative Amortization
Negative amortization may also be referred to as compounding
interest, indexed principal, or interest capitalization. The process
consists of an adjustment to the balance of the loan14" either as
accrued interest or as a direct adjustment to the principal through
an index or revaluation. Thus, any mortgage that results in a peri-
odic increase of the loan balance, as compared to the required pay-
ment reductions, may have legal problems with the negative
amortization.
The Board and the Comptroller have both issued preemptive
rulings that would allow federally chartered S&L's, mutual banks,
and national banks to issue mortgage instruments that negatively
amortize the mortgage balance. 147 There are therefore no restric-
tions on the capability of a federal institution to issue a mortgage
that negatively amortizes over a period of the loan. However, there
is a difference between some of the limitations of the Comptroller
and the Board on negative amortization. 4 8
Many states, either by statute or case law, prohibit the com-
pounding of interest. Many of the new mortgages that incorporate
the "interest on interest" into their instrument may therefore not
between jurisdictions.
144. See Guttmann, supra note 132, at 555.
145. Hyer & Kearl, supra note 4, at 234.
146. For this article, loan balance is defined as the amount of the mortgage upon which
the interest charge is calculated. Thus, the definition incorporates any accrued interest that
is added onto the principal balance; additionally, if the loan balance itself is indexed, the
loan balance may also be adjusted by the revaluation.
147. The Comptroller's ARM regulation recognizes that under 12 U.S.C. § 85 states can
"prohibit a national bank from charging a compound rate below the'usury limit if the sim-
ple rate of interest thus charged would exceed the state limit." 46 Fed. Reg. 18,939 (1981).
Yet the regulation also recognizes that "the federal usury preemption of Section 501 of the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 providels] national
banks with a method, in many cases, of avoiding state usury limits and restrictions on com-
pounding as they relate to these state limits." Id.
The Board essentially enacts the same preemption based on its plenary and exclusive
authority: "This preemption has the effect of precluding the application of the laws of ap-
proximately 30 states prohibiting the charging of interest on interest." 46 Fed. Reg. 24,151
(1981).
148. Compare 46 Fed. Reg. 18,944 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 29.5(d)) with 46
Fed. Reg. 24,152 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a(b)).
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be allowed in those states." 9 Some courts may even consider that
indexed principal (as in a PLAM) is a form of compounded inter-
est and thus not allowed.' 50 Additionally, some statutes or regula-
tions may require the maintenance of a loan-to-value ratio that is
below a certain level.' 5'
D. Disclosure
An important aspect of the new mortgages is the disclosure that
is required for the borrower. As the interest rate risk shifts from
the lender to the borrower, 52 the borrower is confronted with
choices beyond the simple interest rate and payment schedule. It
becomes increasingly important that the borrower be made aware
of all the factors and available options. There are two federal
sources that compel the disclosure of credit terms to a borrower.
The Truth In Lending Act (TILA)'5 s is designed to provide infor-
mation to the borrower so that he is educated in the use of credit
and can then shop around for the best credit terms.15 4 Addition-
ally, Regulation Z' 55 requires all creditors to provide disclosure of
meaningful information.'5 6
149. See Hyer & Kearl, supra note 4, at 227.
150. See Aztec Properties, Inc. v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 530 S.W.2d 756 (Tenn.
1975), cert. denied 425 U.S. 975 (1976) (loan principal indexed to the CPI illegal). The Az-
tec court held that "[ilt would be contrary to the national policy, as expressed by the Con-
gress and as interpreted in several cases by the United States Supreme Court, to permit a
lender to require of a borrower a different quantity or number of dollars from that loaned,
insofar as the principal amount is concerned." Id. at 760. But the court based its argument
on the "Gold Clause" Joint Congressional Resolution of 1933, which was revoked in October
1977 by the Helms Amendment. See McCulloch, The Ban on Indexed Bonds, 1933-77, 70
AM. EcON. REV. 1018, 1018, 1020 (Dec. 1980).
151. See, e.g., 46 Fed. Reg. 24,152 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a(b)(3)).
Generally, these limitations are designed to protect lenders from the problem of an increas-
ing loan balance that may exceed the value of the underlying property.
152. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
153. Pub. L. No. 90-321, § 101, 82 Stat. 146 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-
65a (1976)).
154. Id. § 1601(a).
155. 46 Fed. Reg. 20,848 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.10). Regulation Z is
a Federal Reserve Board regulation issued pursuant to the Truth In Lending Act. Regula-
tion Z was recently revised by the Federal Reserve Board and little has been written about
the revisions. See 46 Fed. Reg. 50,288 (1981) for an interpretive statement of the Federal
Reserve Board. For an analysis of a VRM and Regulation Z prior to revision, see Landers &
Chandler, The Truth in Lending Act and Variable-Rate Mortgages and Balloon Notes,
1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 35, 59-86 (1976).
156. 46 Fed. Reg. 20,892 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 226.1(b)). Significantly, the
latest revision of Regulation Z recognized that:
[T]he act has imposed highly complex and technical requirements on creditors,
produced disclosures that sometimes obscured the important information to con-
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Generally, normal disclosure requirements must be followed for
any mortgage loan. 151 For variable rate mortgages, however, addi-
tional disclosure must be made, consisting of:
(1) The circumstances under which the rate may increase;
(2) Any limitations on the increase;
(3) The effect of an increase;
(4) An example of the payment terms that would result from an
increase.'68
It is important to note that the other disclosure requirements for
the amount financed,15 payment schedule, 60 total of payments, 61
and total sale price12 do not contain provisions for a variable in-
terest or principal adjustment disclosure. The consumer must
therefore realize on his own the effect of the variations on his fu-
ture financial plans. Although provision is made for an example of
the variation, there is no requirement for disclosure of the actual
or potential variations that may occur. The creditor is only re-
quired to make "good faith estimates."' " It is only after a change
in the payment schedule caused by a rate increase that subsequent
disclosure is required.'" This incomplete disclosure will seriously
affect the ability of the borrower to make an informed choice as to
the quality of the index or the potential for future payment
increases. 165
As previously noted, the Board and the Comptroller have im-
posed more restrictive disclosure requirements in their adjustable
mortgage regulations."' The Comptroller's regulation contains an
sumers, and generated costly and burdensome litigation over technical interpreta-
tions of the regulation.
.. The [revised] regulation's focus on simplified disclosure of material terms
should benefit consumers by providing a more useful basis for credit decisions,
and creditors by reducing the difficulty of compliance.
46 Fed. Reg. 20,848 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.1-.10).
157. See generally 46 Fed. Reg. 20,901 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 226.17).
158. See 46 Fed. Reg. 20,903 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.'§ 226.18(f)).
159. Id.
160. Id. The regulation does provide for disclosure of the largest and smallest payments
in a series of variable payments, but it must be assumed that these are capable of being
predicted (such as in a GPM). See id. For sample disclosure forms, see 46 Fed. Reg. 20,932-
33 (1981).
161. 46 Fed. Reg. 20,903 (1981).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Scheuerman, supra note 20, at 653.
166. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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additional requirement of disclosure of a "worst case" example of a
variable rate increase.1 67 Although this will give the borrower addi-
tional useful information, it may also place the national banks in
an unfavorable competitive lending position by requiring them to
provide adverse information that is not required of other lenders.
E. Negotiability.
The negotiability of a mortgage directly affects its attractiveness
on the secondary market. 68 A "holder in due course" ' of a nego-
tiable instrument becomes immune to many of the potential de-
fenses a borrower could use against enforcement of the obligation
by the original lender. 17 0 On the contrary, the variable rate mort-
gages, designed to be responsive to a changing financial environ-
ment, do not promise to pay a "sum certain, 1 7 1 and probably do
not qualify as negotiable instruments.
Two methods can be used to achieve negotiability for a variable
rate mortgage. 17  Under one method, a purchaser can attempt to
obtain a waiver or estoppel certificate from the borrower, thus pro-
viding the purchaser with the same immunity benefits as a holder
of a negotiable instrument. A second method, which draws on the
current procedure used by many participants in the secondary
market,1 73 involves pooling mortgages and selling certificates that
are backed by the pool. The certificates may then become the ne-
gotiable instruments, provided they meet the UCC
requirements. 174
Any instrument that does not have a variable mortgage provi-
sion178 should qualify as a negotiable instrument and consequently
be more attractive in the secondary market. Yet the possibility
that the mortgage may not provide an adequate market return in
an inflationary or rising interest economy may impede the attrac-
167. 46 Fed. Reg. 18,944-45 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 29.8).
168. Hyer & Kearl, supra note 4, at 231.
169. U.C.C. § 3-305 (1978).
170. U.C.C. § 3-305(2) (1978). See also Hyer & Kearl, supra note 4, at 231 n.83.
171. U.C.C. § 3-104(1)(b) (1978).
172. One commentator suggests making the variable rate provision of the mortgage a
separate covenant, thus keeping the note itself negotiable. However, this gives rise to serious
enforceability problems. See Hyer & Kearl, supra note 4, at 231-32.
173. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
174. U.C.C. § 3-106 (1978).
175. E.g., graduated payment, balloon payment, pledged account, or fixed rate
mortgages.
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tiveness of the mortgage for market reasons.""
F. Tax Effects
Although many potential tax problems arise with the use of vari-
able rate mortgages, nothing in the federal tax code should affect
the legality of any of the instruments. One of the key concerns be-
hind tax considerations of new mortgages is the extent of the tax
benefit accruing from them. The borrower must consider the tax
implications of a mortgage instrument just as he would the interest
rate or payment schedule when comparing different mortgages.
The primary consideration for tax purposes must be what in the
mortgage agreement constitutes interest. 17 7 For most of the varia-
ble rate mortgages this is not a problem since the mortgage con-
sists of a stated (albeit flexible) interest rate to be applied to a
fixed loan balance.178 However, a finer question arises when inter-
est is added onto the mortgage balance, 7 or when the principal is
tied to an index that causes it to vary.18 0 In either case, the added
amount represents earned but unpaid interest and it may not be
clear when, or how, this amount should be declared.
Determination of the time that interest is declared depends
upon the method of accounting used by the borrower or lender. 8'
In a residential mortgage, the borrower typically will use cash basis
accounting,' 82 and the lender will use accrual basis.'85 The bor-
rower is not permitted to deduct interest accrued but not yet
paid, 1 84 while the lender includes the interest as gross income in
176. However, the opposite may be true in a declining interest economy.
177. Interest on a loan is generally a deductible expense for the borrower and interest
income for the lender. See I.R.C. §§ 163(a), 61(a)(4) (1980). The traditional test for interest
is "the amount which one has contracted to pay for the use of borrowed money." Old Colony
R.R. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 560 (1932). See generally Rev. Rul. 69-188, 1969-1 C.B.
54 (discussing points paid by a borrower).
178. Examples of this type are the VRM's and RRM's and any other mortgage with a
variable rate that does not involve an adjustable loan balance.
179. E.g., payment capped, graduated payment, or graduated payment adjustable
mortgages.
180. E.g., price level adjusted mortgages. It is unclear whether an increase in principal
would qualify as interest. For this reason, it might be advantageous to specify in the mort-
gage that such an increase is considered as interest to the parties involved.
181. See I.R.C. § 446 (1980). For a complete outline of the requirements, see Rev. Rul.
77-135, 1977-1 C.B. 133-35. This ruling was made in response to a request for the proper
method of reporting interest income and deductions under a GPM.
182. I.R.C. § 446(a) & (c)(1) (1980).
183. I.R.C. § 446(c)(2) (1980).
184. See Rev. Rul. 77-135, 1977-1 C.B. 134.
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the year in which he obtains a legal right to receive the interest."s'
Thus if the borrower is allowed to deduct interest when it is
paid," 6 as under a GPM, this could result in a one year delay be-
tween the time the interest is accrued and the time it is deductible:
[T]he interest under a GPM plan... is deductible by the mort-
gagor in the year paid. The addition of the unpaid interest to the
note does not constitute a payment or receipt of interest. For the
early years of the mortgage term, when the amount of monthly
payment does not fully cover the interest owed, the entire amount
represents interest, and is. . . deductible by the mortgagor when
paid. . . For subsequent years of the mortgage term, when the
amount of the payments has increased to the extent that it now
exceeds the current interest charge owed, the excess . . . will be
treated as discharging first that part of the unpaid balance of the
loan that represents accumulated interest carried over from prior
years and will be . . . deducted by the mortgagor as interest at
that time.1
87
Another tax problem arises when determining the gain or loss on
the sale of the residence. For the simple variable interest rate
mortgage, the interest is distinct from the principal and thus the
basis of the property is determined as with a FRM. ss
G. Due-on-Sale and Prepayment Penalty Clauses
Two controversial clauses found in many mortgages are the
185. "[P]erformance occurs when the lender allows the borrower to use the lender's
money." Id. See also I.R.C. § 451(a) (1980); Reg. 1.451-1(a) (1980); Rev. Rul. 74-607, 1974-2
C.B. 149-50.
186. Hart v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 848 (1st Cir. 1932). See also Rev. Rul. 70-647, 1970-2
C.B. 38.
187. Rev. Rul. 77-135, 1977-1 C.B. 134. An example of interest due and interest paid is
also provided. Note that the ruling considers accrued interest as part of the unpaid balance
of the loan. There remains, however, a distinction between the accrued interest portion of
the unpaid balance and the original principal amount for the determination of what consti-
tutes interest. This is advantageous to the borrower from a tax standpoint since the method
provides the maximum allowable interest deduction, instead of designating part of the pay-
ment as a non-deductible principal repayment. This situation is one of the few instances in
which there is a significant distinction between the accrued interest in the loan balance and
the original principal. Possibly the Internal Revenue Service might consider that the added
balance from an indexed principal mortgage would be considered interest on the mortgage
for the purpose of determining deductibility.
188. I.R.C. § 1012 (1980) establishes that the basis of property (for determination of a
gain or loss) is the cost of the property. I.R.C. § 1016 (1980) provides for several adjust-
ments to this basis.
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"due-on-sale" '189 clause and the prepayment penalty 90 clause.
These clauses are included to protect the lender from borrower ac-
tivities that would deprive the lender of the anticipated return on
the loan. Currently, the permissibility of these clauses is in a state
of flux, both as to their validity and as to the source of regulation.
Several states have disallowed the enforcement of the due-on-sale
clause;19' similar restrictions have been made on prepayment
clauses.192 Pursuant to their preemptive authority, " however, the
Comptroller and Board have made specific provisions and interpre-
tations in their ARM and AML regulations concerning the two
clauses. The Controller has specified that:
National banks offering or purchasing adjustable-rate mortgage
loans are not required to allow those loans to be assumed by new
purchasers of the mortgaged property, or to allow new purchasers
to take title to such property subject to the lien of an adjustable-
rate mortgage loan made pursuant to this Part, regardless of any
limitations on the validity or enforceability of due-on-sale clauses
found in state law, which limitations are expressly preempted.'9
The Board has not specifically preempted state law limitations on
due-on-sale clauses. Yet their desire to make thrift institutions re-
ceive a market return would imply that due-on-sale clauses would
be encouraged, and thus opposing state laws would be preempted.
Assuming the purpose of the ARM is to provide a flexible return
to the lender that corresponds to a fluctuating market rate,
thereby shifting the interest rate risk to the borrower, it is curious
that such an instrument would require a due-on-sale clause provi-
189. Generally, this clause requires that a borrower immediately repay the full outstand-
ing balance of the loan and accrued interest upon the sale or transfer of the mortgaged
property. The clause may also allow the assumption of the mortgage by another only upon
the consent of the lender, who may specify a higher interest rate for the assuming party. See
generally Kelly, Due on Sale Clauses, in MORTGAGES AND ALTERNATE MORTGAGE INSTRU-
MENTs, 377 (R. Sweat ed. 1981).
190. This clause typically requires the payment of a penalty when a mortgage is paid off
prior to the full term of the loan.
191. See, e.g., First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Englewood v. Lockwood, 385 So. 2d 156
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (Cal.
1978); but see Tierce v. APS Co., 382 So. 2d 485 (Ala. 1979) (upholding due-on-sale provi-
sion). Thus, any loans originating from state-chartered or private lenders should conform
with the state regulations for these clauses.
192. Levin & Roberts, supra note 10, at 46.
193. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. For a discussion on the federal preemp-
tion and the due-on-sale clause, see Comment, The Due-On-Sale Clause: Current Legisla-
tive Actions and Probable Trends, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 645 (1981).
194. 46 Fed. Reg. 18,944 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 29.7).
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sion. If the interest rate charged accurately reflects the market re-
turn rate, there would seem to be no need for the additional con-
trol of the lender over subsequent purchasers. However, the
Comptroller maintains that such control is necessary:
The Office believes that a due-on-sale provision is desirable to
provide the lender with the ability to protect itself from addi-
tional market risks. In addition, because the Office has decided to
limit interest rate changes and does not wish to discourage lend-
ers from establishing more restrictive interest rate limitations, the
Office has decided to adopt an expanded provision for banks
choosing to permit assumption. The final regulation allows na-
tional banks to reset at assumption any loan terms, including the
interest rate. The intent of the final provision is to permit banks
to choose the extent to which they want to expose themselves to
additional market risk when assumption is granted.'95
Both the Board's and Comptroller's regulations specifically pro-
hibit any prepayment penalties in the ARM's or AML's.'9 6 This
prohibition recognizes one of the major potential hazards of unreg-
ulated variability of rate changes in a mortgage:
The Board believes that, since the AML regulation gives lenders
broad flexibility in shaping rate-sensitive mortgage loan instru-
ments, borrowers should be given maximum flexibility in locating
alternative sources of financing should a particular interest rate
or monthly payment adjustment prove excessively burdensome. 9 7
The due-on-sale clause and the prepayment clause may be es-
sential to several types of mortgages, and if the clauses are held to
be unenforceable in a state, may prohibit or discourage the use of
these mortgages in that state. The nature of the SAM requires that
the lender retain some control over the appreciated value of the
property upon a resale that would encumber the equity.'" Simi-
larly, with the investment characteristics of a SAM, " a prepay-
ment penalty should be allowed for the early years of a SAM in
order to provide an adequate return on the mortgage invest-
195. 46 Fed. Reg. 18,939 (1981).
196. 46 Fed. Reg. 18,944 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 29.6). The Comptroller
allows a prepayment penalty only until 30 days before the first scheduled rate adjustment
date. See also 46 Fed. Reg. 24,152 (1981) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-4a(b)(4)).
197. 46 Fed. Reg. 24,150 (1981).
198. Levin & Roberts, supra note 10, at 46.
199. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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ment.2 0 0 To facilitate refinancing by the borrower, however, the
Board's SAM proposal did not permit such a penalty. 0 1
V. THE EFFECT OF THE NEW MORTGAGES
The new mortgages are a product of change, and by themselves
will require future changes. An entire industrial, philosophical, and
statutory structure has developed around the fixed rate mortgage.
Now that the underlying economic premise of those mortgages has
been shaken, a new structure must be created to support the new
mortgage instruments.
The financial industry already has begun the change to address
the new economic realities. The Depository Institutions Deregula-
tion and Monetary Control Act of 1980202 has proposed the elimi-
nation of all deposit rate interest ceilings by 1986.203 This move
will place all currently regulated financial institutions on an equal
competitive footing with unregulated institutions for attracting in-
vestment capital. Additionally, the new Board's and the Comptrol-
ler's mortgage regulations provide the federally chartered institu-
tions with the capability to receive a market return on their
mortgage investments, and similarly provide more investment al-
ternatives in the secondary mortgage market.04 The health of
these financial institutions then will depend not on their capability
to respond to economic changes, but on their ability to operate
within the financial marketplace.
Several philosophical changes are required for the acceptance of
the new mortgage instruments. Primarily, the transfer of the inter-
est rate risk from the lender to the borrower is a necessary adjust-
ment that must be accepted if the borrower desires the availability
of long-term mortgage capital at a competitive rate in a fluctuating
and unpredictable economic environment. 0 5 To be able to adjust
to this transfer of risk, the borrower must become educated about
all of the relevant factors entering into any long-term financing de-
200. This is especially true when the interest rate charged is significantly lower than the
market rate. If the loan is prepaid before the property has a chance to appreciate (or if the
housing market is temporarily depressed), the return on the loan would be inadequate, thus
discouraging the use of this type of mortgage instrument.
201. 45 Fed. Reg. 66,803 (1980).
202. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (94 Stat.) 132.
203. Id. § 202(b), 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 142.
204. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
205. If lenders are left with this risk, a large inflation premium will be built into the
interest rate charged. This has been suggested as one of the contributing factors to the high
interest rates of the early 1980's. See Levin & Roberts, supra note 10, at 50.
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cision with concomitant, significant short-term effects. 206 Now that
the borrower must compare a variety of mortgage instruments to
determine the best overall arrangement for his financing needs, he
must be aware not only of his own situation but must also be able
to understand and evaluate each of the provisions of a mortgage.
Finally, the varied mortgage instrument selection will require the
increased participation of financial planners and attorneys in both
the drafting of the instrument and in its evaluation;207 most likely
is the requirement that real estate attorneys become financial
planners as well.
The role of the attorney/financial planner is essentially the same
whether representing the lender or the borrower in a transaction,
since the new instruments contain elements of flexibility that allow
the mortgage to be tailored to the needs of the borrower. Although
some disclosure is required,208 the attorney will have to explain
many features and their effects to the borrower, such as the true
effect of the interest rate increases, negative amortization, and any
limitations or requirements imposed on the borrower.2 09 Another
important task of the attorney is the evaluation of the index that is
to be used and its potential effect on the borrower.210
The final, and possibly most important, structural change that
must be made to fully implement these new mortgages is a revision
of the statutory and legal impediments that have grown up around
FRM's. Since the determination of a fair interest rate will be tied
to some fluctuating market rate, states can no longer allow fixed
interest ceilings as their usury limitations, but must either tie them
206. See Federal Role in Conventional Home Financing: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 188 (1981) (statement of Kent Colton, professor, Graduate School of Man-
agement, Brigham Young University).
These factors include tax considerations, financial forecasting, and family planning. The
value of the mortgage itself may become an important element in various family decisions
such as relocation, resale, adding on to existing homes, and even family planning. See, e.g.,
Gallagher, supra note 98, at 20-21.
207. See Scheuerman, supra note 20, at 738-40. Realistically, it is unlikely that a bor-
rower will educate himself adequately in these matters, since he will make mortgage deci-
sions infrequently.
208. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
209. See Scheuerman, supra note 20, at 739. For example the tax effect, as well as future
income flows, must be analyzed.
210. Id. at 739-40.
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to a similar fluctuating rate or abolish them completely. Generally,
states should modify their laws in the same manner as the federal
government so as to provide a freer flow and availability of mort-
gage funds. By allowing experimentation, states can provide mort-
gage instruments that may address the specific needs of the region.
Finally, more extensive disclosure may be required so as to protect
the borrower and provide the maximum information that is neces-
sary to aid in the understanding and evaluation of the new
instruments.
VI. CONCLUSION
Beginning with the uncertain financial environment of the De-
pression, regulations and institutions were put into force to protect
the innocent borrower from the trauma of refinancing residential
mortgages in a reluctant lending market. The subsequent forty-
year period of relative economic stability gave little incentive for
deviation from the standard, long-term residential mortgage in-
strument that was accepted by both borrowers and lenders. The
unpredictable economic environment of the 1970's and early
1980's, however, thrust traditional lenders into an inadequate posi-
tion to adapt to the changing scenario, resulting in both an insuffi-
cient supply of mortgage capital and a desire to avoid participation
in long-term agreements. The high cost and limited availability of
mortgages for homeowners has affected both the home construc-
tion industry and family perceptions of housing needs.
Slowly, the traditional lenders have tried to find a remedy to
their lending problems through the use of new mortgages that
transfer the risk of economic uncertainty to the borrower, essen-
tially retreating to their pre-Depression responsibilities. The foun-
dation of organizations and regulations that have been built
around the long-term, standard mortgage instrument has been an
area of major reconstruction for the acceptance of the new mort-
gage instruments. Much work remains at both the state and fed-
eral level for the creation of a financial environment that supports
the new mortgage instruments.
Nevertheless the most significant change in the new lending
arena is the necessity of borrower education and understanding of
the new mortgage instruments. No longer may the borrower afford
to be a naive participant in the residential mortgage business. Bor-
rowers must now shop around for the mortgage instrument that
best fits their financial plans, and, along with their attorney and
financial planner, negotiate the best mortgage terms that can be
found in their area.
